business enterprise that has potential for transmission of bloodborne pathogens. An understanding of postexposure requirements and counseling issues is needed by every occupational health nurse providing employee health services in the aforementioned industries.
DEFINING AN OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE
An occupational exposure that presents the potential for transmission of bloodborne diseases can be defined by two parameters: the nature of the injury and the body substance involved. Three types of injuries are implicated: 1. Parenteral or percutaneous exposures, most notably punctures or lacerations by contaminated needles and sharps. For purposes of postexposure management, human bites are included in this category. While there have been no reported cases of HIV transmission through bite injuries, there have been occasional reports of hepatitis B transmission through this route. 2. Exposures of non-intact skin to contaminated body substances. 3. Mucocutaneous exposures most often involving splash or splatter injuries to the mucous membranes of the eyes, nose, and mouth (CDC, 1987a (CDC, , 1988 (CDC, , 1989 (CDC, , 1991 .
Once the specific type of employee injury has been determined, the contaminant body substance/a) must be ascertained. Substances considered potentially infectious for bloodbome diseases are blood, semen, vaginal secretions, and "internal" fluids such as cerebrospinal fluid, amniotic fluid, synovial fluid, peritoneal fluid, pericardial fluid, and pleural fluid (CDC, 1987a (CDC, , 1988 (CDC, , 1989 (CDC, , 1991 .
When training and counseling paraprofessional employees and support staff remind them that procedures or situations that present exposure hazards involving these latter fluids nearly always present the concomitant risk of exposure to blood. Therefore, it probably is not necessary, or even useful, to attempt to memorize those specific substances. In other words, all such situations dictate the use of appropriate precautions applied universally to all clients. In the absence of visible blood, no other body substances have been shown to transmit bloodborne pathogens (CDC, 1987a (CDC, , 1988 (CDC, , 1989 (CDC, , 1990 .
In summary, an occupational exposure incident requiring follow up for the potential transmission of a bloodbome pathogen can be defined as one or more of the three types of injuries de-
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ART I C L E scribed above, which inoculate the worker with one or more of the body fluids or substances noted. While exposures to other body substances may be frightening, employees can be reassured that bloodbome diseases are not transmitted through casual contact, airborne routes, or even through direct contact with other secretions, such as urine, perspiration, sputum, nasal secretions, tears, saliva, emesis, or feces. Nevertheless, common sense dictates prudent handling of all body secretions and excretions with caution due to the possible transmission of other bacterial, fungal, viral, or protozoan organisms (CDC, 1987a (CDC, , 1988 (CDC, , 1989 Gerberding, 1992) .
POSTEXPOSURE MANAGEMENT
When an occupational exposure occurs, the initial intervention is thorough cleansing of the inoculation site. Employees should be advised that immediate removal of the potentially infectious agent is essential in minimizing the risk of infection. Interestingly enough, a significant number of employees will report that their initial response should be to "file a report ofthe incident." Many occupational health nurses relate anecdotes of exposed personnel who arrive in the office with an open, exposed wound and the bloody report in hand! Puncture wounds, lacerations, and open lesions must be washed thoroughly; if running water is not readily available, employers must provide an appropriate disinfectant agent for onsite use. Likewise, exposed mu-cous membranes should be irrigated thoroughly to remove any residue of potentially infectious material (CDC, 1987a (CDC, , 1988 (CDC, , 1989 OSHA, 1991) . Once these measures have been taken, employees should be instructed to complete the necessary report forms and contact the designated department for follow up. It is essential that employees understand the importance of providing a detailed description of the incident.
At this point, the employee who has experienced and reported a valid occupational exposure incident is entitled to a medical evaluation. The results of this evaluation must remain strictly confidential and may not be shared with the employer. The examining clinician may notify the employer that the employee received an evaluation and was advised of the appropriate follow up indicated; no other information obtained by the clinician may be released without the employee's express consent (OSHA, 1991) . The medical evaluation should include:
Baseline testing for human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and hepatitis B (HBV). Even the employee who has completed the HBV vaccine series should be checked to ensure that protective levels of circulating antibodies are present to neutralize inoculum from this exposure. Employees who do not demonstrate adequate HBV antibody titers should be passively immunized to cover this exposure incident, and serious consideration should be given to initiating or repeating the HBV vaccine (CDC, 1989 (CDC, , 1991 Gerberding, 1992) . Baseline HIV testing protects the interests of both the employee and the employer: the employee is attempting to validate that they were not HIV infected when this exposure incident occurred, and the employer is, in effect, attempting to demonstrate that they already were infected. There may well be instances, however, when the employee is reluctant to be tested for HIV: perhaps they have known risk factors, past or present, or they are already aware of existing HIV infection.
Employees are entitled to a 90 day period in which to decide that they do or do not want the baseline HIV test performed (OSHA, 1991) . It is imperative, however, that the baseline sample be drawn at the time of the exposure incident and appropriately preserved until the employee's decision is communicated to the clinician.
HN and HBV testing on the source case, if known and feasible (CDC, 1987a (CDC, , 1988 (CDC, , 1989 (CDC, , 1990 Gerberding, 1992; OSHA, 1991) . The ability to test source cases for the presence of bloodborne infections with or without informed consent in the event of an employee exposure incident varies from state to state and may be subject to statutory, regulatory, and case law: Health care workers in traditional clinical settings, as well as public safety personnel in first responder roles, must know and understand the laws as they apply in their own area of practice. Similarly, exposure incidents that occur as a result of "Good Samaritan" acts mayor may not be subject to existing 132 CE ART I C L E state legislative or regulatory guidelines. Serial testing and support services. If the source case is found to be HIV infected, the exposed employee should be offered serial testing at 6 weeks, 12 weeks, and 6 months. I~after 6 months, the employee remains HIV negative, they are presumed not to have been infected from the exposure incident. During this period, the employee is counseled to report the onset of any acute febrile illness. In addition, they are advised to use appropriate measures to prevent the transmission of any bloodborne disease: avoid needle sharing; practice "safe sex" precautions; defer blood, organ, sperm, or tissue donations; postpone pregnancy; and defer breastfeeding (CDC, 1987a (CDC, , 1988 (CDC, , 1989 (CDC, , 1990 Gerbed ing, 1992) . Most employees and, frequently, their significant others will require extensive emotional support through what may prove to be an intensely stressful, anxious, and frightening experience. Employers are strongly encouraged to provide support services for the exposed employee as well as partners, spouses, household contacts, friends, other family members, or coworkers who may need information, psychological support, and/or reinforcement of behavioral changes (Gerberding, 1992) .
Ifthe source case is found to be HN negative, no further follow up for the exposed employee is mandated. However, if the source case demonstrates significant risk factors or clinical manifestations consistent with HIV re-lated disease, or the employee expresses concern about the source's HIV status, the employer is encouraged to offer the employee serial testing (CDC, 1987a (CDC, , 1988 (CDC, , 1989 (CDC, , 1990 .
If the source case is unknown, decisions regarding follow up of the employee must be made on an individual basis. However, it seems prudent to offer the employee follow up consistent with a known HIV or HBV infected source unless there is strong and compelling evidence that the source was not likely to be infectious. Even then, an employee's concern about the potential acquisition of a bloodborne disease as a result of the exposure incident probably warrants a full scale follow up for psychological comfort as well as a risk management concern (CDC, 1987a , 1988 , 1989 , 1990 OSHA, 1991) .
The clinician evaluating the employee who has experienced an occupational exposure incident must also remember to assess the indications for other interventions, such as tetanus prophylaxis, syphilis testing/prophylaxis, and other forms of viral hepatitis.
Individuals undergoing HIV testing should receive pre-and posttest counseling according to parameters defined by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 1987b (CDC, , 1993 CDCP, 1990 (CDC, 1987b (CDC, , 1993 CDCP, 1990 ) . The posttest counseling session should include a review of the preceding information to assure comprehension, evaluate retention , and assess the individual's attempts to apply the information in a realistic manner in everyday life. In addition, the test result is disclosed with an appropriate interpretation of its meaning, given the clinical and behavioral history obtained from the client. The HIV negative subject requires a review of all para-
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The HIV positive (infected) client is strongly encouraged to initiate primary care services as soon as possible and notify sex and needle sharing partners of their potential exposures. In many states, the public health department will assist with partner notification and can very effectively accomplish this task without disclosing the identity of the referring client.
The infecte d client also may need referrals for mental health counseling or social services. Disclosure of test results is often a major concern to test subjects, and they may need extensive support as they struggle with decisions related to "who to tell," "when to tell," "how to tell," and "who will you [the clinician] tell?" Whenever possible, the HN positive subject should be interviewed at a future date to determine their coping ability, decisions about primary care, support systems in place, and need for further intervention. Counseling or information exchanges may also be offered to family members, spouses, partners, or other support persons with the client's knowledge and consent (CDC, 1987b (CDC, , 1993 CDCP, 1990 ; Gerberding, 1992 ) .
The relative risk of transmission of HBV via a needlestick injury ranges from 5% to 43% (Gerberding, 1992) . Fortunately, the efficacy and safety of pre-and postexposure HBV vaccine and postexposure passive immunization for workers at risk can sub-stantially reduce the rate of occupational transmission (CDC, 1991 ) . In contrast, the relative risk of transmission of HN via a needlestick injury has been calculated at 0.3% to 0.4% (CDC , 1989; Gerberding, 1992; Tokars, 1993 ) . While this may be a reassuring statistic to occupational health personnel, it is hardly comforting to the injured employee.
Minimizing employees' concerns utilizing relative risk figures is not particularly supportive and is not an effective substitute for empathy, compassion, effective interpersonal communication skills, and therapeutic relationships with knowledgeable care providers. Ironically, occupational health clinicians often find themselves caught in concurrent but conflicting roles: employee advocate and agency administrative representative/liaison.
In the experience of the authors, this creates a difficult situation for employee health personnel and often puts them in untenable positions with conflicting interests. As a result, they often withdraw from establishing supportive relationships with employees undergoing follow up. The withdrawal occurs to avoid the perceptions of disloyalty to the agency administration or for fear of perpetuating evidence or information which may later prove "incriminating" in a workers' compensation case.
The use of chemoprophylaxis for health care workers exposed to HN in clinical settings is controversial. While no evidence substantiates the efficacy or safety of postexposure treatment with an-tiretrovirals such as zidovudine (AZT ), dideoxycytidine (dd C ), and/or dideoxyinosine (ddl ), many agencies elect to offer exposed employees the option of postexposure chemoprophylaxis with informed consent. Some employers offer the option to any exposed employee. Other employers stratify the risk based on the source patient's clinical status, history of antiretroviral therapy, and type of employee injury, offering chemoprophylaxis in very specific circumstances.
When making the decision for or against postexposure chemoprophylaxis, employees need to consider potential short term and long term toxicities, pregnancy or imminent conception, emerging viral drug resistance, and cost. Employees who consent to such therapy must be vigilantly monitored for side effects, toxicity, indications for dose adjustments, and/or discontinuation of therapy.
Currently, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of the Public Health Service does not make a recommendation for or against the use ofpostexposure antiretroviral chemoprophylaxis. Therefore, there is no "standard of care" and no standardized protocols, procedures, dosage schedules, or treatment plans. The decision must ultimately be made by the individual employee and the clinician, perhaps with input from significant others.
The occupational health clinician's role is to provide adequate information and emotional support for the employee to make an informed decision, with the knowledge that they may alter 134 CE ART I C L E that decision at a future date if desired (CDC , 1990; Gerberding, 1993; Tokars, 1993 ) .
SUMMARY
The management of employees during follow up for an occupational exposure for bloodborne pathogens presents clear opportunities and challenges for the occupational health nurse. These include understanding the intent of the OSHA Bloodborne Pathogens Standard, identifying postexposure follow up requirements, counseling workers for pre-and posttest procedures, protecting the confidentiality ofmedical records and information, and educating both employees and management about bloodborne pathogens and the potential for transmission. Postexposure follow up is also another opportunity for the occupational health nurse to educate employees about health promotion and disease prevention.
